





The industrial area is used for processing and packaging the main export 
products for the country. There are several residences and apartment buildings lo-
cated within approximately 300 m to the southwest of the RSCL. There is a signif-
icant amount of criminal activity in the general area at night as reported by the se-
curity forces, due to its location and proximity to various commercial properties. 
On average, there are five cars stolen per year or vandalized in the immediate vi-
cinity. To tackle this concern, state actors conduct comprehensive and credible 
threat assessments followed by appropriate actions to improve radiological securi-
ty. 
Threat assessment is the practice of determining the credibility and validity of 
a potential threat, and to acknowledge the probability that the estimated threat can 
be activated into reality. This study analyzes a hypothetical radiological research 
organization using modeling tools. The research evaluates three (3) facilities at the 
radiological organization and their Physical Protection System (PPS) to assess pos-
sible entrances and diversion. The three (3) major facilities being considered for 
this research at the RSCL are the Calibration Laboratory (F1), the National Reposi-
tory (F2), and the Interim Storage facility (F3). The buildings allocated for these 
facilities are strategically spaced from each other to allow effective transfer of ma-
terials and also to support routine security response concerns. 
The site security plan prepared by the stakeholders has considered the need 
for periodic threat assessment to be conducted to support the response team and 
maintain effective security onsite. This condition with initial probabilities of ad-
versary attack as 0.26, 0.15 and 0.42 leads the scenario into a state of varying 
probabilities of threat at the three (3) facilities being considered; F1, F2 and F3 re-
spectively. The research conducts several repetitive runs of the threat assessment 
process using the modeling tools, by considering different response elements that 
could potentially be added to the design to reach the desired response margin and 
overall system effectiveness. After thirteen (13) simulation event trials, a steady 
state is reached with final probability of adversary attack values as 0.60, 0.09 and 
0.14 for facilities F1, F2 and F3 respectively. The several trials conducted and the 
steady state reached serves as a guide for facility managers to acknowledge and de-
termine the resources required to control adversary attacks at the various facilities 
considered at the nuclear organization. 
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With the increase in the application of nuclear technology around the globe, 
there is a need to institute predictive and prudent measures at nuclear and radiolog-
ical facilities and activities to adequately and effectively protect their materials 






This implies that the human factor and security culture as defined by the In-
ternational Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in the Nuclear Security Series No. 7, 
plays a crucial role in the entire nuclear security architecture of any organisation or 
state. Physical Protection Systems for nuclear facilities and radiological sources are 
designed to protect and/or prevent possible malicious acts.  
The dynamic significant threat environment has evolved such that, relying on 
the perception that certain nuclear materials are self-protecting, can lead to the 
sabotage and unauthorized removal of facility assets by insiders. These assets are 
manned by management members and employees who are trained and trusted to 
maintain procedures and practices required for the routine operation and develop-
ment of the associated facilities and activities. 
The methodological approach utilized in this research as a predictive potential 
insider model adapts initial data from the threat group table of the hypothetical fa-
cility, Anshar Radiation Source Calibration Laboratory and National Repository 
(RSCL). 
The initial state vector values adapted from the threat group table with a high, 
medium and low potential insider attribute analysis are; 0.42% 0.33% and 0.25% 
respectively of the employee population at RSCL. 
This methodology is designed to quantify the likely outcome of an imple-
mented internationally recommended security culture model to guide management 
of nuclear and radiological facilities in preventing sabotage and theft at nuclear and 
radiological facilities. 
Over a 20 year period (ie. trials), involving an annual International Atomic 
Energy Agency (IAEA) recommended self-assessment of the facility security cul-
ture, a steady state of 0.38%, 0.35% and 0.27% of the employee population indi-
cating a fairly balanced security system. 
The obtained steady state will aid the managers of RSCL to acknowledge and 
make the necessary changes to the knowledge training development of personnel, 
the controlled authorized access granted to the employees at various divisions of 
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The number of radioactive materials used in the radiological facilities around 
the world demands for an effective security to be put in place.  Ensuring the safe 
operation of facilities that uses radioactive materials has always been priority of 
States, personnel and the general public. The main idea is to keep these operating 
